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Abstract 
 Grounded in Social Exchange Theory (SET), this study is motivated by two 
unresolved issues. First, scholars find mixed results on how relationship duration facilitates 
business-to-business (B2B) trust. The lack of consensus results from the assumption that 
relationship duration is a measure of prior trust-building efforts. We contend that 
trust-building lies in exchanges between B2B partners, and relationship duration moderates 
the effects of reciprocal exchanges. Second, although Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) is one 
of the most used theoretical lens in the study of B2B trust, TCA is criticized for neglecting 
the exchange process in B2B trust-building. To provide clarity to these issues, we empirically 
validate that bilateral asset specificity constitutes social exchange processes, which 
communicate goodwill reciprocity and equivalence reciprocity. Empirical findings suggest 
that, within bilateral asset specificity: (1) achieving goodwill reciprocity always enhances 
trust, regardless of the duration contingency; and (2) violating equivalence reciprocity 
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impairs trust over the duration. 
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Always Trust in Old Friends? Effects of Reciprocity within Bilateral Asset Specificity on 
Trust in International B2B Partnerships 
1. Introduction 
Grounded in Social Exchange Theory (SET), this research addresses two unresolved 
theoretical issues in interorganizational trust literature. The first observation is that empirical 
works report inconsistent findings regarding how relationship duration facilitates 
business-to-business (B2B) trust. We thus aim to offer a clarification on the role of 
relationship duration in B2B trust-building process. The other theoretical puzzle is from the 
Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA). The article seeks to fill a gap in theory regarding social 
aspects of exchange and its development process, specifically related to asset specificity in 
the context of B2B trust. Our effort is directed to a widely lamented issue (Granovetter 1985; 
McEvily et al. 2003; McEvily and Zaheer 2006) that TCA downplays social foundations of 
transactions (e.g., meta-analysis evidence from Palmatier et al. 2006; Leonidou et al. 2014; 
Zhong et al. 2017). Heeding the warnings in the literature, we empirically focus on bilateral 
asset specificity and its role in underlying social exchange process that triggers goodwill 
reciprocity and equivalence reciprocity.  
The conventional view asserts that adequate relationship duration strengthens 
interorganizational trust through connecting two parties beyond the discrete transaction, 
enhancing mutual understanding, and aligning them to pursue common goals (Dwyer et al. 
1987; Morgan and Hunt 1994). For example, Ganesan (1994) states “…such periods provide 
both parties with a greater understanding of each other and their idiosyncrasies. Thus, 
experience with the vendor is likely to increase a retailer's trust in the vendor's credibility and 
benevolence (p.5).” This theme repeats itself in relationship marketing studies as they 
underline with the same tone that relationship duration accrues interorganizational trust 
(Anderson and Weitz 1989; Doney and Cannon 1997; Zhang et al. 2016). However, empirical 
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findings are mixed. Scholars find that the connection between relationship duration and 
interorganizational trust varies from positive effects (Brashear et al. 2003; Zhang et al. 2016; 
Dong et al. 2017), to insignificant effects (Heide 1994; Palmatier et al. 2006; Ekici 2013; 
Vanneste et al. 2014), to negative effects (Gulati and Nickerson 2008). Therefore, the role of 
relationship duration on interorganizational trust-building remains unclear. 
Building on the Dwyer et al. (1987) conceptual framework, empirical studies attribute a 
constructive role in developing a mutual understanding and maturity of relationship 
(Anderson and Weitz 1989; Gulati 1995; Bejou et al. 1996; Sa Vinhas and Heide 2014). 
Despite such optimism, the length of relationship does not guarantee mutual reliance and 
relationship bonding (Fichman and Levinthal 1991). Instead, relationships mature during the 
social exchange process along with the complex experience of shared ideas and form a 
mutual identity over bonding between two parties. (Blau 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell 
2005; Cook et al. 2013). In other words, what matters is not how long the relationship lasts, 
but what has been done in the exchange dynamics within the course of the relationship. 
Responding to inconsistent empirical findings, scholars call for process-based perspectives on 
interorganizational trust rather than directly viewing relationship age as a proxy for 
accumulated trust-building efforts (Heide and Wathne 2006; Möllering 2006; Akrout and 
Diallo 2017; Zhong et al. 2017). Thus, our first research question is: How does relationship 
duration affect the trust-building process in international B2B partnerships? 
Based on SET, this article posits the contingency role of relationship duration in 
interorganizational trust-building. The process lies in the relationship dynamics between two 
parties – how they communicate certain social norms and comply with them. By complying, 
they ensure both predictability and stability to facilitate trust (Blau 1964; Cropanzano and 
Mitchell 2005; Cropanzano et al. 2016). As such, repeated mutual understandings and 
expectations on certain norms are incrementally communicated, learned, and internalized 
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through continuing interactions (Cook et al. 2013). Over time, the fog gradually clears in 
partners’ behavior, norms get established, compliance leaves a track record. Alongside with 
growing compliance, predispositions also multiply, the partners’ expectations turn sharper 
and stricter to ensure sustainable exchange and reduced relational risk. (Blau 1964; Cook et al. 
2013). Hence, the importance of norm-complying exchanges on trust increases over time. 
With this view, one notable contribution of the current study is to identify relationship 
duration as a contingent moderator between norm-complying exchanges and trust.  
Second, another issue within interorganizational trust-building studies is a void left by 
the Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA). Although the most widely used theoretical lens (i.e.,  
Leonidou et al.'s 2014 meta-analysis), TCA often receives critical scrutiny in the examination 
of interorganizational trust. The reasons include neglect of social context, path dependencies, 
and the interactive process in relationship bonding (Granovetter 1985; McEvily et al. 2003). 
McEvily et al. (2003) state “the Williamsonian view reflects an under-socialized view of the 
organization and coordination of economic activity and the relationship between economic 
actors, based on a limited understanding of how trust really works (p.99).” Responding to the 
critiques on applying TCA to interorganizational trust-building, we address the underlying 
reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity.  
The present study draws from the Social Exchange Theory to propose a more socialized, 
context-oriented, and path-dependent investigation on the usage of TCA framework in 
interorganizational trust. Our approach has merits. For instance, Zhong et al. (2017) after a 
meta-analysis suggest that TCA and SET could be complementary perspectives in 
understanding trust across organizational boundaries. Each party interprets the opponent’s 
move depending on whether or not the move complies with the reciprocity norm (Blau 1964; 
Emerson 1976; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Cook et al. 2013). Given that TCA-based 
studies claim asset specificity to be one of the most influential factors in interorganizational 
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relationships (Geyskens et al. 2006; Palmatier et al. 2006), we investigate how reciprocity 
within bilateral asset specificity would influence interorganizational trust. Accordingly, our 
second research question is: Does reciprocity within bilateral asset specificities play a role in 
the trust-building process in international B2B partnerships? 
Building on SET insights, any form of ‘give-and-take’ interaction constitutes a social 
exchange process. Accordingly, we contend that bilateral asset specificity consists of an 
underlying social exchange process between the parties, a process that affirms the opponent’s 
goodwill, strengthens the reciprocity beliefs, and indeed elevates trust. The reciprocity is also 
constitutive. It facilitates an expectation that a good-deed engenders the return of the 
good-deed (Blau 1964; Molm et al. 2007). In the mutual exchange of positive behavior, 
reciprocity emerges in two components (Gouldner 1960; Hoppner and Griffith 2011; 
Hoppner et al. 2015; Swärd 2016). In the one, the concept of reciprocity is construed on 
exchanges of latent goodwill intentions (partner’s actions in the dyad are more 
mutual-interest driven than self-interest driven). In the other, reciprocity is built on the 
equivalence of contributions (the level of investment in comparison to that of the partner). 
The present investigation contributes to the literature by identifying goodwill reciprocity and 
equivalence reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity to extend the field’s understandings. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce the relevant 
literature on relationship marketing and describe how applying the SET extends our 
knowledge. Next, we illustrate our conceptual framework and hypotheses. We then report an 
empirical study of 202 international buyer-seller relationships. Methodology and empirical 
results are also presented. Finally, we conclude with theoretical extensions and managerial 
implications.  
 
2. Theoretical Background  
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2.1 Interorganizational Trust  
Trust is a focal factor in interorganizational relationship studies (Ganesan, 1994; Morgan 
& Hunt, 1994). For example, Heide (1994) delineates trust as an inter-organization 
governance mechanism that improves cooperation and reduces opportunism in 
interorganizational exchange. Doney, Cannon and Mullen (1998) define interorganizational 
trust as "… as a willingness to rely on another party and to take action in 
circumstances where such action makes one vulnerable to the other party” (page 4). McEvily 
et al. (2003) state that mutual trust creates favorable conditions for partners to cooperate and 
generate improved performance. Extant studies empirically verify that trust-based 
international B2B relationships enjoy superior relationship performance (Zhang et al. 2003; 
Cavusgil et al. 2004; Katsikeas et al. 2009).  
Although the importance of interorganizational trust is widely acknowledged, two 
questions remain unanswered. First, the role of the relationship duration is unclear. 
Conceptual works explore the role of relationship duration in trust but differ on the question 
of why and how. For example, Dwyer et al. (1987) propose a conceptual model to 
differentiate between discrete transactions and relational exchanges, suggesting that 
relationship duration transforms economic transactions into social exchanges. Anderson and 
Weitz (1989) posit that the age of the relationship represents the level of bilateral relationship 
inertia in repeated interactions that signify established communications and reliable routines. 
Similarly, empirical findings are significantly mixed, even among meta-analysis studies. One 
meta-analytical study corroborates that relationship duration fails to influence 
interorganizational trust (Palmatier et al. 2006), but another meta-analysis suggests the 
relationship duration augments interorganizational trust (Zhong et al. 2017). 
2.2 Asset Specificity  
Asset specificity is a central piece in TCA. In particular, the TCA posits a strong and 
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purely calculative view of the concept. Put simply, TCA considers the difficulty of 
redeployment of assets outside the relationship due to specificity. The resulting lock-in 
condition requires the safeguarding control and places the investing party in an unfavorable 
position (Williamson 1985; 1991). Bilateral asset specificity lock-in both the parties in the 
relationship and reduce the concern on opportunism (e.g. Ganesan (1994); Poppo et al. 
(2015)). TCA-based studies in interorganizational relationship employ the calculative view 
that bilateral asset specificity stabilizes relationship by creating a “mutual hostage” condition 
(Heide 1994; Sa Vinhas and Heide 2014).  
This above view of asset specificity draws criticism as an under-socialized explanation. 
The void in the explanation, the scholars argue, emerges from a static framework neglecting 
attitude changes (Chiles and McMackin 1996); assumption of calculative bounded rationality 
regardless of the relationship context (Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Bachmann and Zaheer 
2008); and a strong assumption of behavioral opportunism across early and mature 
relationships (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Moreover, relationship stage and contingencies 
of past exchanges alter the social meanings to the relationship-specific investments perceived 
by each party (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Cook et al. 2013; Cropanzano et al. 2016).  
Recognizing the warnings from extant research, we deploy a more socialized angle to 
examine the TCA framework in interorganizational trust-building (Wathne and Heide 2000; 
McEvily et al. 2017). In our view, the SET is a useful companion to serve in augmenting the 
theoretical arguments of TCA. SET studies suggest that any form of bilateral interaction in 
the ongoing ‘give-and-take process’ constitutes a social exchange process (Blau 1964; 
Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Cook et al. 2013). Accordingly, we investigate the underlying 
social exchange process within bilateral asset specificity.  
 
2.3 Social Exchange Theory  
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Social Exchange Theory (SET) explores social interaction within the exchange process 
(Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976). As one of the prominent views in interorganizational 
relationships (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), SET regards trust as the crucial factor that 
stabilizes a relationship because trust induces partners to be less calculating and more 
collaborative to achieve mutual goals (Blau, 1964, Emerson, 1976). In agreement with Zhong 
et al. (2017) that TCA and SET could be complementary perspectives in understanding 
interorganizational trust, this research provides a fresh perspective by integrating related 
research streams. 
We borrow from the SET to shed light on multiple theoretical puzzles. First, we propose 
a model which employs the contingency approach to examine interorganizational 
trust-building. According to SET, trust cultivation lies in an exchange process where both 
partners fulfill their mutual expectations on focal norms such as reciprocity. Affirming 
experiences, in turn, foster stronger reciprocity expectations and future reciprocating 
behaviors (Cook et al., 2013). We aim to understand how the links between reciprocating 
activities and trust are dependent on the relationship duration, as the shared beliefs of 
reciprocity norms evolve through the history of interactions. SET asserts that norms in a 
continued social exchange root deeper and get sanctioned over time (Blau, 1964; Cook et al., 
2013). This learning process gradually reinforces the exchange behavior and a stronger 
reciprocating stance. Therefore, the SET offers a sound basis for theorizing duration as a 
contingency in interorganizational trust-building.  
Second, the SET extends our knowledge by identifying reciprocity within bilateral asset 
specificity. The TCA explanations of asset specificity are purely calculative and 
forward-looking. Based on SET, the TCA rationale overlooks the exchange process in the 
dynamics of relationship-specific inputs between parties. For example, Blau (1964) states: 
“individuals and groups are interested in, at least, maintaining a balance between inputs and 
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outputs and staying out of debts in their social interactions; hence the strain toward 
reciprocity.” Because reciprocity is bilateral, SET asserts that the level of complying with 
reciprocity to one party’s relational inputs would depend on the other’s level of relational 
inputs (Cook et al. 2013). Therefore, we integrate TCA and SET perspectives, offering a 
discussion of inherent social meanings across different scenarios within bilateral asset 
specificity to address the neglected social contextualization in TCA. 
Extant studies from other disciplines support the idea of underlying reciprocity within 
bilateral asset specificity. For example, behavioral economists suggest that game players’ 
reciprocity expectations deepen along accumulated practice of bilateral behavior in repeated 
games (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher 2006). Evidence from 
behavioral economists suggests that reciprocities can be operated through certain strategic 
interactions between two economic sectors. The idea that reciprocity would be signified, 
operated, and performed within bilateral asset specificity is also mentioned in a 
meta-analytical review of relationship marketing studies (Palmatier et al. 2006). After an 
examination in the interorganizational relationship management literature, Palmatier et al. 
(2006) suggest: “integrating reciprocity into the relational-mediating framework may also 
explain the large, direct effect of relationship investment on performance, such that people’s 
inherent desire to repay ‘debts’ generated by sellers’ investments may lead to 
performance-enhancing behaviors (p.152).” We follow this suggestion and empirically 
examine how reciprocity can be signified, operated, and performed within idiosyncratic 
bilateral asset specificity.  
Finally, extending the SET literature, we identify certain interorganizational activities 
within the bilateral asset specificity that fulfill reciprocities. Cropanzano et al. (2016) review 
the SET theoretic remedies in business research and indicate that SET scholars emphasize 
hedonic value but overlook the exhibited activities. Cropanzano et al. (2016) suggest future 
11 
 
SET studies should further examine how the initiating and responding activities in a 
relationship shape the participants’ attitude and future behaviors (page 46). In response, the 
present investigation identifies how social norms evolve through exhibited activities (the 
bilateral asset specificity in our research context) at the interorganizational level. 
2.4 Reciprocity: The Focal Norm in Trust-Building 
Reciprocity is a critical element in interorganizational exchanges (Dwyer et al. 1987; 
Rokkan et al. 2003; Zhang et al. 2016). Bagozzi (1995) identifies reciprocity as “the core of 
marketing relationships (p. 275).” Palmatier et al. (2006) suggest “The classic mediating 
model of relationship marketing should be adapted to include alternative mediated pathways 
(e.g., reciprocity) (p.150 in Table 6).” Empirical studies also examine the virtue of reciprocity 
in relationship marketing (Dwyer et al. 1987; Heide and John 1992; Bello et al. 2003; 
Hoppner et al. 2015). Palmatier et al. (2009) address the role of customer gratitude in 
relationship marketing based on the rationale of reciprocity. Overall, the importance of 
reciprocity in interorganizational relationship management has been widely acknowledged. 
In the interorganizational relationship management area, reciprocity is generally defined 
as a unidimensional concept (Heide and John 1992; Aulakh et al. 1996; Gençtürk and Aulakh 
2007; Paswan et al. 2017). Conceptualization of unidimensional reciprocity in 
interorganizational studies ranges from increasing interdependences in collaboration (Dwyer 
et al. 1987), exchange of favors in the mutual give-and-take process (Serva et al. 2005), to 
reciprocation of relational benefits (Lioukas and Reuer 2015).  
To resolve inconsistencies in conceptualizing reciprocity in the literature, recent research 
regards reciprocity to be a multi-faceted concept in interorganizational partnerships. Pervan et 
al. (2009) investigate sales relationships in industrial marketing and find that reciprocity 
evolves with both partner’s communication affirming goodwill and equity/balance of the 
relationship. Hoppner and Griffith (2011) empirically verify two sub-facets of reciprocity in 
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the context of international B2B relationships: immediate exchange of goodwill and return of 
favors in equivalence. Swärd (2016) conducts in-depth interviews and finds that 
interorganizational trust lies in both small actions that incrementally contribute to the 
expression of goodwill and large actions that strongly signify and invoke reciprocal reactions 
for equivalence. 
Accordingly, we follow Gouldner (1960), Hoppner and Griffith (2011), and Swärd 
(2016), examining two facets of reciprocity in bilateral asset specificity: goodwill and 
equivalence. Goodwill reciprocity refers to the exchange and affirmation of each other’s 
good-deed toward mutual-interest motivations, which is evaluated through the mutually 
contingent exchange of gratifications. Equivalence reciprocity is fulfilled when the level of 
effort or return is equivalent to that of the partner (Gouldner 1960; Hoppner and Griffith 2011; 
Hoppner et al. 2015). 
3. Research Framework & Hypotheses 
Our conceptual framework is depicted in Figure 1. Achieving goodwill reciprocity lies 
in the interdependent exchange process: one party’s reciprocating action would align with the 
other’s past action. Continuing dyadic exchange is interdependent and contingent on the 
partner’s goodwill.  When perceiving goodwill from the partner’s reciprocating actions, an 
exchange party is more likely to have the higher level of trust in the relationship(Blau 1964; 
Cook et al. 2013). Homans (1958) suggests that the opponent’s responding actions with 
reciprocating gratitude could be viewed as a social reward that brings the sense of satisfaction 
and reliability to the relationship. Blau (1964) specifies that such exchanges secure the 
relationship with more predictability toward the future, and relational factors related to 
long-term oriented attitudes such as trust, commitment, and loyalty would evolve through the 
social rewarding process. More recent SET studies verify that the interactive process of 
exchanging goodwill is the micro-foundation of forming social exchanges (Rao et al. 2005; 
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Molm et al. 2007). The goodwill exchanges provide the lasting momentum in building trust 
in ongoing relationships. Therefore, we propose:  
Hypothesis 1: Achieving goodwill reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity enhances 
trust in international B2B partnerships. 
In SET, the concept of equivalence suggests that the distribution of effort is 
approximately equivalent between the participants (Cook et al. 2013). Following SET, we 
suggest that breaching equivalence reciprocity harms the participant’s trust since equivalence 
reciprocity implies reliability and stability of the exchange (Gouldner 1960; Hoppner et al. 
2015; Swärd 2016). Based on SET, equivalence is crucial in sustaining long-term 
relationships as it signifies a balanced structure between participants that neither participant 
perceives being unfairly exploited (Emerson, 1976). Violating equivalence reciprocity sends 
out negative signals. An imbalanced structure creates uncertainty about long-term 
sustainability. The partner being exploited may seek out alternative relationships if available 
(Blau 1964). Not adhering to equivalence reciprocity reflects instability, lack of predictability, 
and creates greater vulnerability for each participant (Hoppner and Griffith 2011; Hoppner et 
al. 2015). This signals unpredictability on a partner firm’s future strategies and thus 
undermines trust (Cook et al., 2013). Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2: Violating equivalence reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity harms 
trust in international B2B partnerships. 
We assert that the importance of reciprocity on trust becomes more prominent over the 
relationship duration. SET suggests that reciprocity norms can be more understood, 
internalized, and emphasized in longer relationships, amplifying the impact of reciprocity on 
trust. In accordance with Homans (1958), reciprocity requires a generalized exchange where 
equivalent returns are not necessarily immediate but, over time, a balance of exchange must 
be achieved. Accordingly, trust accrues as the relationship evolves. The reciprocating process 
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can create a self-reinforcing cycle, as the norm of reciprocity becomes more accepted, 
established, and internalized. As such, each partner demands more reciprocated efforts in the 
relationship. That is, higher expectations evolve after both parties have cooperated and 
attained mutual reliance. Hence, we contend that both goodwill and equivalence reciprocity 
within bilateral asset specificity become more salient in mature interorganizational 
relationships. Because relationship duration implies higher mutual expectations on reciprocity, 
reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity that achieve or violate the norm would become 
more impactful on trust over the relationship duration. Thus, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3a: Achieving goodwill reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity more 
strongly enhances trust over the duration of international B2B partnerships. 
 
Hypothesis 3b:  Violating equivalence reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity more 
severely harms trust over the duration of international B2B partnerships. 
In harmony with the extant literature, we contend that interorganizational trust enhances 
relationship performance in international partnerships (Delbufalo 2012; Zhong et al. 2017). 
Relationship performance refers to the effectiveness and efficacy of the collaborative 
relationship (Selnes and Sallis 2003; Katsikeas et al. 2009; Katsikeas et al. 2016). Trust 
enables smooth bilateral communication and coordination that maximize the relationship’s 
potential. Empirical studies have demonstrated that international trust-based B2B 
relationships lead to better relational performance through forming and reshaping long-term 
oriented behaviors and attitudes (Chiou and Droge 2006; Zaheer and Zaheer 2006; Katsikeas 
et al. 2009). Trust brings beneficial effects in interorganizational collaboration such as 
information sharing (Bachmann and Zaheer 2008) and fewer concerns for opportunism (Dyer 
2002). Based on these arguments, we propose: 




------ Insert Figure 1 About Here ----- 
4. Method  
4.1 Measuring Goodwill and Equivalence Reciprocity within Bilateral Asset Specificity 
Three theoretical and technical reasons support our decision to measure reciprocity in 
bilateral asset specificity. First, responding to critiques of TCA (Granovetter 1985; Ghoshal 
and Moran 1996; Zhong et al. 2017), this study directly examines reciprocity within bilateral 
asset specificity. Second, studies in interorganizational relationship management share the 
convention of using bilateral asset specificity to measure a variety of focal constructs in SET, 
such as accumulated invested costs in a relationship (Gulati and Nickerson 2008), level of 
embeddedness (Gulati and Sytch 2007), and power structure (McEvily et al. 2017). Our 
analysis aligns with previous SET studies and proposes the meaning of reciprocity within 
bilateral asset specificity. Finally, our measurement design is widely used and verified in 
other well-established studies (see He and Wong (2004), O’Reilly and Tushman (2008), and 
Li and Huang (2012)), indicating the methodological robustness of our construct 
operationalization. As such, we investigate how bilateral asset specificity communicates 
goodwill reciprocity and equivalence reciprocity. An overview of reciprocity elements is 
presented in Table 1.  
------ Insert Table 1 about here ----- 
In our model, we employ the interaction-term between buyer and seller’s asset 
specificity to measure goodwill reciprocity. Interaction-term measures how the impact of one 
independent variable on the dependent variable is contingent on the moderator (Hair et al. 
2009). As discussed, goodwill reciprocity is bilateral. It refers to the exchange and 
affirmation of each other’s good-deed through the mutually contingent interaction of 
gratifications. When the buyer has invested asset specificity and the seller reciprocates with 
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corresponding asset specificity commitments, the buyer would perceive goodwill in the 
seller’s compliance with reciprocity to reinforce trust. Therefore, the buyer’s asset specificity 
investment is associated with the perceived goodwill of the seller. Accordingly, we measure 
the interaction terms between the buyer and seller’s asset specificity to evaluate goodwill 
reciprocity. Empirical studies offer reasonable support for the operationalization. Jap and 
Ganesan (2000) conceptualize the interaction between bilateral asset specificity as reciprocal 
actions that facilitate commitment in a B2B relationship. De Vita et al. (2010) mention that 
bilateral investments (interaction-term) can be regarded as a credible signal of self-enforcing 
commitment in an exchange relationship. 
TCE-based relationship marketing studies employ the interaction-term between buyer 
and seller’s asset specificity to measure the relationship stability created by “mutual hostage” 
condition (Artz 1999; Joshi and Stump 1999). Williamson (1985) suggests mutual 
investments of bilateral asset specificity as an alternative safeguarding mechanism to 
hierarchy control. However, follow-up empirical studies employ the interaction-term between 
buyer and seller’s asset specificity to measure “mutual hostage” condition do not find 
consistent empirical support. Artz (1999) finds that the interaction-term of bilateral asset 
specificity does not significantly increase relationship performance. Joshi and Stump (1999) 
report interaction-term of bilateral asset specificity even undermines joint actions.  
Commenting on the insignificance of proposed reciprocal asset specificity on 
performance, Artz (1999) comments “ … it may be that certain governance mechanisms, e.g., 
relational norms, can effectively moderate the impact of these factors thereby allowing 
interfirm exchanges to continue (page 11).” Responding to the call, we testify the underlying 
social exchanges within bilateral asset specificity that performs reciprocity. Regarding the 
interaction-term between bilateral asset specificity, our framework suggests that SET-based 
explanation of reciprocity is a more robust conceptualization than the TCA-based logic of 
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mutual hostage. The reason is that we identify trust as the focal mediator that connects the 
interaction-term of bilateral asset specificity with relationship performance. As Blau (1964) 
states ”only social exchange tends to engender feelings of personal obligations, gratitude, and 
trust; purely economic exchange as such does not.” Our identification of the trust mediator 
supports the underlying social exchanges and explains the unsupported hypotheses presented 
by TCA-based investigations (Artz 1999; Joshi and Stump 1999). 
The proposed model also considers the effect of equivalence reciprocity through 
observing the inequality between the buyer and seller’s asset specificity. To measure 
inequality, we adopt absolute difference, which is an adequate measure to capture the level of 
inequality between two variables (He and Wong, 2004). SET has two explanations regarding 
inequality in bilateral relationship contributions. One is that the more dominant partner uses 
its power advantage to demand the opponent sacrifice unilateral contributions and take 
advantage of the opponent’s excessive efforts (Emerson 1962; Ebers and Semrau 2015). 
Because power structure is controlled in our model, we believe inequality within bilateral 
asset specificity reflects the other SET explanation that participants fail to fulfill the norm of 
equivalence (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). We justify this conclusion noting that any 
distortion in bilateral asset specific contributions will impede the trust between the parties 
involved. 
4.2 Scales & Measurements 
We employed scales established in the literature.  Additionally, modified scales are 
employed to accommodate to address the needs of our model. All scales are listed in the 
Appendix. The measurement of the supplier and buyer’s asset specificity is adapted from 
Katsikeas et al. (2009), Heide and John (1990), Rokkan et al. (2003). The scale for trust is 
adapted from Doney and Cannon (1997). The relationship performance construct is modified 
from Selnes and Sallis (2003). Control variables include industry, firm age, firm size, 
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dependence, contact frequencies, and psychic distance between the buyer and seller.  
To capture the effect of cross-national variation, we use psychic distance as a subjective 
measure of dissimilarity between the international buyer and seller in the context of culture, 
language, and legal systems (Johanson and Vahlne 1977; 1990). Psychic distance is a 
well-developed concept in the international business literature. It refers to “the sum of factors 
preventing the flow of information from and to the market.” (Johanson and Vahlne 1977) 
Also, we contend that using a self-reported measure better fits the assertions of the SET. 
Social Exchange Theory suggests that interpretations of the social signals are subjective 
(Blau 1964). Using self-reported psychic distance measures appropriately controls the 
respondent’s subjective awareness of cross-national differences, better aligning with the SET. 
Finally, psychic distance allows us to capture the overall influences caused by cross-national 
differences (Katsikeas et al. 2009; Obadia et al. 2015). 
Aligning with the interorganizational relationship management literature, we follow the 
definition proposed by Doney and Cannon (1997) and argue interorganizational trust as “the 
perceived credibility and benevolence of a target of trust” (p.2). In accordance with a review 
article on interorganizational trust measures (Seppänen et al. 2007), this is one of the mostly 
used definitions in the interorganizational relationship management literature. 
To rule out alternative explanations other than reciprocity in trust-building, we capture 
and control the effect of the power structure in each interorganizational relationship. 
Specifically, the SET suggests that power structure is an alternative motive driving each 
participant’s relationship-specific investments (Blau, 1964), and dependence imbalances in 
each relationship is a strong proxy for power structure (Emerson 1962). Thus, we control the 
level of dependencies to address the effect of our focused reciprocity norm.  
To check for common method variance (CMV), we employed the CFA marker approach. 
The subjects are questioned about their perceived goal importance in attending trade shows 
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with items adapted from Godar and O'Connor (2001). CFA marker technique requires a 
marker variable that is theoretically unrelated to the focal variables, for which its expected 
correlation with the focal variables is zero (Lindell and Whitney 2001). After consulting with 
two knowledgeable scholars, we conclude that the proposed CFA marker (the buyers’ goals of 
attending the trade show) has no confounding effect on our study.  
Overall, all items used were reviewed by two expert academics as well as two 
experienced practitioners to check for face validity in this specific research context. 
4.3 Data and Research Subjects 
The present study employs SET to analyze a relationship with the unilateral focus on the 
buyer’s viewpoint. A unilateral data collection is carried out. There are two reasons for the 
research design. First, a unilateral focus allows us to simplify the reciprocity interpretations. 
Although an exchange is embedded within the dyad, SET assesses the role of interpretation 
of social outcomes (i.e. social reward minus social cost) as a determinant of norm compliance 
and perceived relational bond ( Blau, 1964; Granovetter, 1985; Holmes, 1981). For our 
research, considering interpretations from both bilateral sides may require massive controls 
on other unrelated issues between the dyad, such as misalignments in perceptions caused by 
information asymmetry. As a pioneer study investigating sociological meanings underlying 
asset specificity, we contend that a unilateral focus on the buyer’s side avoids excessive 
ambiguity. Therefore, a unilateral focus on the buyer’s perspective fits our research purpose 
in addressing the contextual meaning of asset specificity.  
Second, reciprocity in social exchanges is typically based on subjective assessments. 
Before reciprocating, a partner must sense, read, and interpret the other side’s actions. The 
effectiveness of this process depends on the receiver’s visceral interpretations of such actions 
(Blau, 1964; Holmes, 1981). The proposed empirical analysis based on primary data is 
consistent with the tenets of SET. Overall, a unilateral focus concurs with the SET in 
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providing a compelling analysis. 
Research Subjects. The data used in this investigation is from a large-scale survey of 
senior procurement executives representing international buyers in the global electronics 
industry. The sampling scope includes very different companies without particular focus on 
region or country. In the electronic OEM–supplier context, buyers have alternative options to 
partner up with different sellers (Kang et al. 2009; Jean et al. 2010). This is important because 
the SET assumes that partners hold the discretion of choosing alternative partnerships 
(Emerson, 1972, 1976). In addition, the electronics industry is not immune to high 
uncertainty and risk. Firms in this industry must learn to cope with short product life cycles, 
technological uncertainty, and difficulties in negotiations for better margins. Business cycles 
in the electronics industry mature fast, making it a suitable industry to examine relationship 
development. As such, the global electronics industry is an ideal choice for the present 
investigation.  
To access the senior procurement executives of buyer firms in the electronics industry, 
the sampling frame comprised of registered buyers in the annual convention of Computex 
Taipei. This event is Asia’s largest, and the world’s second-largest, ICT (Information and 
Communications Technology) trade show. The event attracts a large cross-section of senior 
procurement executives in the industry. It is a meeting place for manufacturers of notebooks, 
tablet PCs, motherboards, servers, wafer OEMs, LCD monitors, WLAN (Wireless Local Area 
Network, and PND (Portable Navigation Devices). Since 1981, Computex Taipei has come to 
be known as an elite gathering of innovators and entrepreneurs who showcase the most 
advanced and innovative ICT products. As such, this trade show provides an ideal venue for 
both a wide spectrum of subjects and gaining access to electronics industry senior executives. 
We randomly selected 1,300 cases among the buyer firms registered in Computex 2014. 
Executives at each firm were contacted and asked whether they would be willing to 
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participate in the survey. After eliminating invalid cases, complete survey data were secured 
from 202 respondents. The final response rate was 15.5 percent. The countries of origin for 
the buyers and sellers are summarized in Table 2. A rich variety of sub-industries are 
represented: software/IT: 25.25 %; electronics: 30.69 %; chemicals: 1.5 %; 
telecommunications: 7.9 %; engineering: 8.9 %; and others: 25.76 percent. Respondents are 
owners (5.9%), top managers including CEOs, CFOs, CMOs and the like (17.3%), middle 
managers (36.6%), purchasing and sales account managers (20.7%) from global buyer 
companies. The average tenure (years of service) of respondents is 7.4 years. Each informant 
was asked to respond concerning the buying relationship they considered the most critical to 
their firm.  
------ Insert Table 2 about here ----- 
4.4 Structural Equation Modelling Analysis 
For the analysis, we followed the approach suggested by Hair et al. (2012). These 
authors point to the complementary characteristics of covariance-based sequential equation 
modeling (CB-SEM) and partial least square sequential equation modeling (PLS-SEM). 
Following their suggestion, we first used the CB-SEM technique to conduct a CFA to check 
the measurement model validity including all of our used variables measured with reflective 
scales. Then, PLS-SEM is used to test the structural model where we have variables with 
both formative and reflective measures. Psychic distance, one of our control variables, is a 
predefined formative latent variable. Using PLS-SEM to conduct the structural model 
analysis allows us to benefit from PLS’s flexibility in specifying both formative and 
reflective measures without loss of information in the data set (Hair et al. 2012). The PLS 
analysis was conducted using SmartPLS version 3.1.9 software with the defaulted 
bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap method and 500 subsample settings. The CFA was 
conducted using LISREL ver. 8.54. 
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We assessed the convergent validity of constructs by examining the average variance 
extracted (AVE) and the significance of item loadings. The AVE attempts to measure the level 
of explained variance that a latent variable component captures from its indicators relative to 
the amount due to measurement error. The AVE values should be greater than the 0.50 cut-off 
level (Gefen et al. 2011). The construct reliability is examined using the composite reliability 
(CR) developed by Werts et al. (1974). Acceptable values of CR statistic should exceed 0.70 
(Fornell and Larcker 1981). To evaluate the discriminant validity, we compared the square 
root of AVE with the correlations among the latent variables (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
To contend with both interaction and inequivalence between buyer and seller’s asset 
specificity, we followed the method used by a series of empirical studies from another 
established literature stream (He and Wong 2004; Cao et al. 2009; Raisch et al. 2009). Our 
two-way and three-way interaction terms (i.e. interaction-term between bilateral asset 
specificity, interaction-term between bilateral asset specificity × duration, and inequivalences 
between bilateral asset specificity × duration) were generated based on the two-stage 
approach in SmartPLS with mean-centered interaction terms to avoid multicollinearity. 
Because our measures of buyer and seller’s asset specificity are paralleled items, we 
generated our inequivalence measures with absolute difference values across pairs of matched 
items. The reliability and validity checks empirically support the appropriateness of this 
approach. 
 Finally, we conducted a CMV post check with a comprehensive CFA marker technique 
presented by Williams et al. (2010). Compared with the partial correlation CFA marker 
technique proposed by Lindell and Whitney (2001), the comprehensive CFA marker 
technique accounts for the measurement error; therefore it is a superior statistical test for 




5.1 Measurement Model Results. 
The CFA results are reported in Table 3. The CB-SEM technique was employed to 
conduct the CFA to ensure robustness of our measurement model. All item loadings reach 
statistical significance, indicating convergent validity. The CFA model goodness-of-fit 
(CFI=0.97. NNFI=0.95, SRMR=0.058) indicators are satisfactory (Hu and Bentler 1999). 
Construct reliability is supported by composite reliability statistics above 0.7. The AVE 
statistic is above 0.5, indicating convergent validity (Hair et al., 2009). 
The correlation matrix and discriminant validity check are presented in Table 4. All 
square roots of the AVEs are greater than the off-diagonal elements in the corresponding rows 
and columns, demonstrating discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Overall, these 
results show that all statistics in the measurement model reach the requisite threshold 
suggested in the literature. We thus confirm the measurement models’ validity using multiple 
indicators: reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. 
------ Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here ----- 
5.2 Structural Model and Hypothesis Testing 
The PLS structural model checks are summarized in Table 5. He and Wong (2004) 
recommend two separate examinations of the interaction-term and absolute difference in two 
models to avoid ambiguity in the interpretation of the results. Accordingly, we examined five 
PLS structural models by stepwise addition of focal independent variables to ensure 
robustness of the results. The Model 1 is the baseline model including only control variables. 
Because H4 is the widely accepted hypothesis in literature, we firstly added H4 (trust --> 
performance) and H1 (goodwill reciprocity --> trust) to Model 2 to incrementally check the 
validities of the added hypothesis. The increase in R2 and a minor decrease in SRMR between 
Model 2 and Model 1 indicates the appropriateness of adding two variables. The significance 
of coefficients in Model 2 empirically supports H4 and H1. Compared to Model 2, in Model 
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3 includes Hypothesis 3a (goodwill reciprocity × duration --> trust). The statistical 
insignificance of the corresponding coefficient and increased SRMR denote that Hypothesis 
3a is not supported. 
Model 4 examines the main effect of violating equivalence reciprocity between asset 
specificity on trust. Compared with Model 1, the values of R2 and SRMR are greater in 
Model 4. However, H2 is not supported. In Model 5, we add Hypothesis 3b, which argues 
that relationship duration moderates the link between violating equivalence reciprocity and 
trust. Hypothesis 3b is confirmed. Model 6 indicates the robustness of results with all 
variables included. Overall, Three of five hypotheses are empirically supported (Table 6). 
------ Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here ----- 
Figure 2 illustrates the interaction effect within bilateral asset specificity (Model 2) 
presented in Table 4. In Figure 2, scenario A in the upper-right side on the dotted line reflects 
the practice of equivalence reciprocity (high in both buyer and seller’s asset specificity), 
where the corresponding trust value on the vertical axis is the highest. Scenario B over the 
middle-right side on the solid line implies the buyer’s indebtedness of reciprocal acts (high in 
seller’s asset specificity but low in buyer’s), where the corresponding trust value on the 
vertical axis is the second highest. The middle-left side of the dotted line, Scenario C, denotes 
practices of the discrete transaction (both low in buyer and seller’s asset specificity), where 
the corresponding trust value on the vertical axis is the third highest. The practice of priming 
trust with favors is described in scenario D over the bottom-left side on the dotted line (high 
buyer’s asset specificity but low in seller’s), where the corresponding trust value on the 
vertical axis is the lowest.  
Figure 3 illustrates how relationship duration serves as a moderator variable. With short 
durations (the dotted line with negative slope, given duration equals to mean duration -1× 
standard deviation), an increase in inequivalence within bilateral asset specificity would not 
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significantly decrease trust. In contrast, the solid line with a negative slope denotes long 
durations (given duration equals mean duration +1×standard deviation), where an increase in 
the magnitude in asset specificity inequivalence significantly diminishes the level of trust. 
------ Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here ----- 
5.3 Common Method Variance 
The results were examined for common method variance (CMV), concluding that the 
results are not biased by CMV. First, two of the hypotheses are moderating effects, and the 
results indicate statistical significance. According to Siemsen et al. (2010), CMV does not 
severely bias if the moderating hypothesis reaches statistical significance. Hence, the 
statistical significance of Hypotheses 3b indicates that CMV is not problematic.  
Second, in our questionnaire design, we varied the format of measurement items, from a 
7-point scale (e.g., trust) to open-ended numbers (e.g., duration). The anchor labels of 7-point 
scales also vary from construct to construct. These are measurement designs recommended 
for avoiding CMV (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Podsakoff et al. 2012). 
Finally, we followed the procedures recommended by Williams et al. (2010) and 
included a CFA marker in our questionnaire for statistical post check. The results are 
summarized in Table 7. We first added the marker items into our item pools and conducted an 
additional CFA analysis. The results provide reference values for conducting the baseline 
model parameters. We then added the marker to conduct the baseline model with the 
orthogonal approach suggested by Lindell and Whitney (2001). Next, we allowed the other 
items to be loaded on the marker with the equality constraint to build the Method-C model. 
The insignificant Chi-square difference between baseline model and Method-C model 
indicates a lack of congeneric method variance (Williams et al., 2010). Finally, we let the 
items used to be freely loaded on the marker to conduct the Method-U model. The 
insignificant Chi-square difference between Method-C and Method-U indicates the results are 
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not biased by non-congeneric method variance (Williams et al., 2010). 
------ Insert Table 7 about here ----- 
6. Discussion 
Our empirical findings shed light on the two unresolved issues that motivated the 
present study. First, the results offer clarifications on the moderating role of relationship 
duration in interorganizational trust cultivation. Second, based on the empirical findings, we 
verify reciprocity in bilateral asset specificity. A proposed typology is offered to identify four 
scenarios in bilateral asset specificity, and we address the buyers’ corresponding level of trust 
across the four possible conditions. 
6.1 The Contingency Role of Relationship Duration in B2B Trust-Building 
We find empirical support for the view that inequivalences within bilateral asset 
specificity impair trust over the relationship duration (H3b). Results suggest that violating 
equivalence reciprocity becomes more harmful to trust over time. Indeed, as can be seen in 
Table 5, relationship duration does not directly influence trust (as a control variable), but 
significantly moderates the impact of inequivalent asset specificity on trust (H3b). The 
findings align with our contention that relationship duration is the contingency in 
interorganizational trust-building rather than an antecedent to measure overall trust-building 
efforts. 
Interestingly, some empirical findings are contrary to expectations. Hypothesis 3a, 
where we propose goodwill reciprocity becomes more influential on trust over the duration, is 
not supported. Likewise, Hypothesis 2, proposing that violating equivalence reciprocity 
harms trust is not supported. However, the findings support another associated proposition 
that violating equivalence reciprocity becomes more harmful to trust over relationship 
duration (Hypothesis 3b).  
Plausible explanations for the unsupported hypotheses lie in the different level of 
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strictness between goodwill and equivalence reciprocity. Goodwill reciprocity has a relatively 
loose requirement that only requires the seller’s asset specificity to reciprocate with the 
buyer’s. However, equivalence reciprocity further requires the approximately equivalent level 
of bilateral asset specificity contributions. Goodwill reciprocity is relatively tolerant of the 
partner’s behavior in exchange for the possibility of future pay off. The SET suggests trust 
cultivation always requires initiating the process with goodwill so that the other party will 
reciprocate. This, in turn, creates another round of reciprocating exchanges (Blau 1964). A 
purpose for signaling goodwill is to indebt the other party to reciprocate the favor, but not 
necessarily immediately or equivalently (Blau 1964). Goodwill reciprocity permits relatively 
loose norm-actualization, and thus it functions universally across all relationships. Our 
findings suggest that achieving goodwill reciprocity is a universal norm in trust cultivation 
that is important, regardless of relationship maturity.  
On the other hand, equivalence reciprocity strictly warrants partners to reciprocate in 
relatively equivalent value. This requirement is rigid and stricter. In that, it might take longer 
for participants to understand, accept, and internalize as a mutually accepted norm and shared 
obligation. This result suggests the idea that young relationships might have completely 
different anticipation in bilateral asset specificity compared to mature relationships. Early in 
the relationship, there is a ‘honeymoon effect’ which makes the partners less aggressive in 
their demands and interprets the relational behavior with a positive forward look (Fichman 
and Levinthal 1991). In the more mature relationships, this pattern is replaced by a hangover 
effect which more strictly measures the equivalence in relational contributions; such 
expectations are formed incrementally through the historical experiences of give-and-take.  
Therefore, the differences in the level of strictness between two reciprocity facets might 
explain the finding that: (1) the main effect of goodwill reciprocity on trust is significant (H1), 
but the main effect of equivalence reciprocity on trust is not supported after controlling the 
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duration (H2); (2) influences of equivalence reciprocity on trust are duration-dependent 
(H3b), but of goodwill reciprocity are duration-independent (H3a). 
6.2 Reciprocity within Bilateral Asset Specificity: A Proposed Typology 
The study findings confirm goodwill reciprocity between buyer and seller’s asset 
specificity in trust-building (H1). Interorganizational trust cultivation lies in the series of 
social exchanges that confirm and update each partner’s goodwill. This research demonstrates 
that such goodwill exchange can be achieved within idiosyncratic bilateral asset specificity. A 
buyer interprets the goodwill sent from the seller’s asset specificity contingent on the buyer’s 
incumbent level of asset specificity.  
Based on our findings, we propose a typology of four possible scenarios. This typology 
is depicted in Figure 4. In each, we examine, from the buyer’s perspective, how trust 
develops from bilateral asset specificity. The four scenarios include: (i) both parties provide 
contributions with high asset specificity; (ii) low levels of buyer’s asset specificity, but high 
levels of seller’s; (iii) high levels of buyer’s asset specificity, but low levels of seller’s; and 
(iv) both parties provide low asset specificity.  
 ------ Insert Figure 4 about here ----- 
The upper-right corner in Figure 4 denotes the case that both goodwill and equivalence 
reciprocity is attained, meaning both the buyer and seller have a history of high mutual asset 
specificity. In this case, high levels of asset specificity are exchanged with equivalent 
contributions. Under these conditions, goodwill reciprocity is achieved through reciprocating 
responses, and equivalence reciprocity is satisfied through an approximately equivalent level 
of contribution. Attainments in both facets of reciprocity ensure the strongest future 
predictability in the relationship and thus generate the highest level of trust. 
In the upper-left corner of Figure 4, the level of buyer’s trust is second highest when 
receiving excessive favors in goodwill. In this scenario, the buyer recognizes the seller’s 
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sacrifice as a goodwill gesture to trigger future reciprocal exchanges. The buyers in this 
scenario attain more options to act. That is, the buyer can choose to: (1) selfishly enjoy the 
partner’s excessive asset specificity and terminate the relationship by stopping the exchange 
process; or (2) to reciprocate with equivalent asset specificity contributions which, in turn, 
strengthens the mutual trust in the relationship (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1972, 1976). In other 
words, the buyer can potentially take advantage of the seller’s excessive asset specificity. 
These results indicate that the perceived goodwill from the seller’s unselfish sacrifice will 
generate the second highest level of the buyer’s trust. 
The bottom-left corner illustrates a scenario of discrete transactions without significant 
social interactions or norms. In this scenario, the buyer’s trust is the third highest. Here, given 
the absence of asset specificity from each party, neither participant is handicapped if the 
relationship is terminated ( Blau, 1964). The SET refers to this as “economic exchange” as it 
represents standardized economic agreements (Blau, 1964). In the case of discrete 
transactions, buyers are involved in economic transactions without many exchanges within 
bilateral asset specificity. The buyer’s trust toward the seller is based on the contractual 
obligations and market institutions.  
The buyer’s trust is lowest in the ‘favor given in initiating goodwill reciprocity’ scenario, 
represented at the bottom-right corner in Figure 4. Buyers in this scenario encounter the 
potential risk that the partner might not adhere to norms of goodwill reciprocity. The buyer’s 
high levels of asset specificity imply the buyer’s expectation of future payback. If such 
expectation is not fulfilled, discord arises (Molm et al., 2007). The lack of reciprocal asset 
specificity may lead to disappointment by the buyer. The buyer’s trust toward the seller 
declines along with continued excessive favors. 
7. Implications and Directions for Future Research 
7.1 Theoretical Contributions 
30 
 
The present investigation contributes to our understanding of interorganizational trust in 
four important ways. First, we offer a novel perspective in attempting to resolve mixed 
findings regarding the role of relationship duration in interorganizational trust-building. The 
study addressed a weakness in existing research – viewing relationship age as a direct 
measure of relational bonding and overall efforts on cultivating trust. Building on social 
exchange theory (SET), we have been able to demonstrate that interorganizational trust 
results from the reciprocal exchanges. The relationship develops as the participants 
incrementally communicate, internalize, and mutually accept the meanings and requirements 
of reciprocity ( Blau, 1964; Cook et al., 2013; Homans, 1958).  
In other words, the results support the view that it is not necessarily how long the 
relationship endures that builds trust, but it is how parties interact and communicate with 
each other during the relationship. Hence, we confirm that relationship duration does not 
directly enhance trust but rather moderates the effect of reciprocating actions on trust. Figure 
3 depicts how relationship duration moderates the connection between asset specificity 
inequivalence and trust. We provide an empirically supported explanation for the conflicting 
findings regarding the influence of relationship duration. Therefore, the findings clarify the 
contingency role of relationship duration with theoretical insights and empirical support. 
Second, we address an overlooked approach in interorganizational trust-building -- 
underlying reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity. The present study extends our 
understanding of asset specificity by proposing the contextual meanings that are neglected in 
transaction cost analysis. The contingent meanings in bilateral asset specificity represent a 
significant departure from how most scholars have been using calculative logic in interpreting 
asset specificity. In line with ample critiques of TCA (Granovetter 1985; Chiles and 
McMackin 1996; Ghoshal and Moran 1996), our findings suggest organizations are not 
purely economic-rational entities in managing interorganizational relationships. We offer 
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rigorous evidence that the TCA overlooks the social exchange process and interactive nature 
of interorganizational trust-building. We specify that organizations are dependent on 
pre-dispositions and generate interpretations on asset specificity which are socially embedded 
in the ongoing exchanges between dyadic parties. The results yield new nuances of the social 
exchange process within bilateral asset specificity to extend traditional theoretical concepts. 
Hence, the findings contribute to interorganizational trust studies by specifying reciprocity 
within bilateral asset specificity.  
Further, we specify the mutual-contingencies between buyer and seller’s asset specificity 
on trust cultivation. Because the TCA deemphasizes the interactive exchanging nature, 
TCA-based studies on interorganizational trust portray a simplistic linear connection of one 
partner’s asset specificity on trust with the calculative logic (e.g. Doney and Cannon (1997); 
Katsikeas et al. (2009)). Studies delineate that, because asset specificity increases the 
investing party’s switching cost to be locked-in the relationship, the opponent would reduce 
concerns for being exploited by the investing partner’s opportunistic behaviors and thus 
elevates the opponent’s trust (Williamson 1994; Geyskens et al. 2006). An underlying 
assumption in the TCA-based frameworks is one party’s asset specificity on trust is 
independent of the other’s existed level of asset specificity. This assumption does not 
consider the social contingencies, relationship stages, and social norms. According to the SET, 
meanings of relationship-specific inputs are contextual-oriented and highly dependent on the 
history of interaction (Blau 1964; Molm et al. 2007). We empirically verify that, in the 
dynamic social exchange process within bilateral asset specificity, how buyers read and 
perceive reciprocity in the seller’s asset specificity would depend on the buyer’s incumbent 
level of asset specificity (Figure 4).  
 Third, this research responds to the call for robust examinations of interorganizational 
reciprocity. Scholars have been ardent about the mechanisms and conceptualization of 
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interorganizational reciprocity (Rokkan et al. 2003; Palmatier et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2016). 
In line with studies that suggest multi-faceted reciprocity in interorganizational relationship 
management (Hoppner and Griffith 2011; Hoppner et al. 2015; Swärd 2016), the present 
investigation further identifies how the dual reciprocity facets (i.e. goodwill and equivalence) 
are fulfilled within bilateral asset specificity that, in turn, affect interorganizational trust.  
Moreover, the study details how relationship duration varyingly moderates the effects of 
dual reciprocity facets on trust. Regarding goodwill reciprocity, our findings suggest that 
goodwill is universally essential in cultivating trust across different relationship stages. 
Achieving goodwill reciprocity provides momentum in sustaining interorganizational trust in 
relationships. On the other hand, equivalence is a stricter facet of reciprocity that requires 
decent communication and mutual understandings to be commonly accepted. Our findings 
suggest that violating equivalence reciprocity is not universally harmful to trust across all 
relationship stages. However, as the relationship matures, the expectation for equivalence is 
heightened, and each party becomes less tolerant of inequivalent efforts between the parties 
(Cook et al., 2013; Gouldner, 1960). As relationship tenure lengthens, uneven bilateral asset 
specificity violates the equivalence reciprocity principle and erodes trust.   
 Finally, this research also contributes to the SET. In the context of cross-border B2B 
relationships, our findings reveal that each party learns and internalizes norms of reciprocity 
through continuous observation of their international partner’s past actions. Numerous SET 
studies discuss the cross-cultural differences of norms accepted in different societies (Leung 
and Morris 2015; Gelfand and Jackson 2016). In a cross-border partnership, common grounds 
on appropriate reciprocity may be limited due to cultural differences. However, the present 
study suggests mutual requirements on reciprocity can still be established through continuing 
social exchanges between international buyers and sellers. Therefore, the findings 
demonstrate that reciprocity norm can be established and fulfilled in cross-border 
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partnerships; such norms are shaped through ongoing bilateral strategic actions such as asset 
specificity.  
7.2 Managerial Implications 
The present study offers four implications for managerial practice. First, practitioners 
would find the proposed contingency role of duration on interorganizational relationship 
management to be of importance. Findings support the view that, in evaluating the robustness 
of interorganizational trust, the duration of the relationship is not a solid direct indicator. The 
contingent effect of relationship duration on trust is demonstrated. Hence, managers should 
seek for more process-based indicators such as mutual asset specificities in a partnership.  
Second, managers should also be cognizant that each firm’s expectations in a business 
relationship evolve over time. To maintain trust in interorganizational relationships, managers 
should accordingly adjust their decisions and activities to align with the dynamic expectations 
and changing norms in the relationship. Our findings also imply such collaborative 
adjustments with reciprocating attitudes takes time to achieve. Managers should be aware that, 
because bilateral consensus on equivalence takes a fair amount of time to achieve, attaining 
equivalence reciprocity is a long-term relational asset in international B2B connections. 
Therefore, practitioners should regard long-term relationship trust as a unique resource that is 
valuable, rare, costly to imitate, and difficult to be substituted (Barney 1991). The 
development of such a competitive advantage lies in mindful management in ongoing social 
exchanges with senses of time horizon.  
Third, this study specifies the mutual-contingencies between buyer and seller’s asset 
specificity in interorganizational trust. We identify the underlying exchange process within 
bilateral asset specificity in the interorganizational relationship management. In addition to 
the conventional idea of cost-benefit analysis on investment evaluations, practitioners should 
also be aware of the reciprocal message being sent when making business decisions in 
34 
 
interorganizational relationship management. Our findings suggest that even asset specificity, 
a factor that most scholars and practitioners interpret and evaluate with economic rationality, 
can carry substantial social signals in interorganizational relationships. Therefore, managers 
should be cognizant of signals sent by one’s partner and should reciprocate accordingly.   
Finally, the study implies that strategic decisions should not solely depend on static 
analysis but have a long-term and dynamic view. The present value analysis in investment 
evaluations might neglect the potential future benefits of long-term business relationship 
buildings. Benefits from a relationship should not be limited to present accruals, but be 
valued for their potential from the future undertaking. Overall, our research suggests that, in 
addition to economic rationale, practitioners should recognize the values of reciprocity within 
bilateral asset specificity to bond with key business stakeholders. 
7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
While the current study provides rich theoretical and practical implications, there are 
good grounds for future research. First, due to time and financial constraints, all respondents 
completed the questionnaire within a limited time frame. We gathered information on both 
independent and dependent variables from a cross-sectional design. Therefore, 
mono-respondent bias is a concern. Future research may benefit from using panel data to 
clarify the dynamic aspects and capture possible extensions of the present framework.  
Also, as a study with the focus on reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity, this 
research follows the SET and focuses on goodwill and equivalence exchanges. Future studies 
might consider examining other social meanings within bilateral asset specificity, such as 
fairness, justice, and altruism.  
Third, to ensure that our findings are generalizable to different cultures, this study 
investigated international buyer-seller pairs from a variety of country bases (see Table 2), and 
controlled psychic distance in each cross-border partnership pair. Future studies can test our 
35 
 
theorization in different settings to examine the contextual influences. For example, 
institutional effects might be another contingent variable to examine if our framework 
performs differently across advanced markets, emerging markets, and developing markets.  
Fourth, based on multiple meta-analysis studies in interorganizational relationship 
management (Geyskens et al. 1999; Palmatier et al. 2006; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 2011; 
Leonidou et al. 2014), interorganizational trust is defined as a unidimensional construct. 
Accordingly, we used one of the mostly applied definitions from Doney and Cannon (1997) 
to align with this research stream. However, we suggest future studies use a multi-faceted 
definition of interorganizational trust to thoroughly examine the effects of goodwill and 
equivalence reciprocity.  
Finally, the proposed conceptualization of reciprocity may also be performed within 
other types of bilateral business activities, such as joint marketing campaigns and R&D 
investments. It is hoped the present investigation will motivate scholars to pursue such 
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a: Achieving or violating the reciprocity norm within bilateral asset specificity; Control 
variables include buyer’s asset specificity, seller’s asset specificity, dependences, contact 





















Figure 2. Interdependences between Buyer and Seller’s Asset Specificity on Trust 
















All stats are standardized.  
Scenario A: Buyers perceive equivalence reciprocity, where the buyer’s trust level is highest. 
Scenario B: Buyers are indebted by receiving excessive goodwill from the seller, where the 
buyer’s trust level is 2nd highest. 
Scenario C: Buyers perceive discrete transaction, where the buyer’s trust level is 3rd highest. 
Scenario D: Buyers are insecure by giving excessive goodwill without reciprocal feedback, 
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Figure 3. Relationship Duration Moderates the Connections between Violating 














All stats are standardized. Note: The dotted line denotes that at early relationship stage, 
inequivalence within bilateral asset specificity does not significantly influence trust. However, 
in relationships with longer durations (the solid line), inequivalence in bilateral asset 












































Descriptions for each quadrant:  
Upper-right: Both equivalence and goodwill reciprocity are fulfilled, where the buyer’s trust 
level is the highest (1st). 
Upper-left: Buyers are indebted by receiving excessive goodwill, where the trust level is 2nd 
highest. 
Bottom-left: Buyers perceive discrete transaction, where the trust level is 3rd highest. 
Bottom-right: Buyers are insecure by giving excessive goodwill without reciprocal feedback, 
where the trust level is the lowest. 
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Level of Trust: 2nd. 
 
Perceived the seller’s goodwill intentions 




Level of Trust: 1st. 
 
Both goodwill and equivalence reciprocity 




Level of Trust: 3rd. 
Discrete exchange without significant 
social interactions involved or obligated 
norms. 
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Level of Trust: 4th. 
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Equivalence in bilateral 
contributions devoted or 
output received 
(Gouldner, 1960; 
Hoppner & Griffith, 
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Table 2. The Country Bases of Sampling Dyads  
Regions Buyers  Sellers 
Africa 2 - 
China 13 57 
Europe 39 19 
India 12 1 
Indonesia 5  
Japan 10 13 
Malaysia 1 - 
Mongolia 1 - 




Oceania 6 - 
Philippines 5 1 




South Korea 4 5 
Taiwan 60 66 
Thailand 2 1 
 
Asian buyers and sellers are reported at country-level.  





Table 3 CFA Results and Reliability Tests for Reflective Measures 
Items Standardized 
Loadings  
Construct CR Construct 
AVE 
Buyer’s Asset Specificity 1 0.832** 0.9171 0.7351 
Buyer’s Asset Specificity 2 0.919**   
Buyer’s Asset Specificity 3 0.882**   
Buyer’s Asset Specificity 4 0.791**   
Seller’s Asset Specificity 1 0.863** 0.9169 0.7341 
Seller’s Asset Specificity 2 0.888**   
Seller’s Asset Specificity 3 0.868**   
Seller’s Asset Specificity 4 0.806**   
Trust 1 0.759** 0.8854 0.6602 
Trust 2 0.736**   
Trust 3 0.855**   
Trust 4 0.890**   
Relationship Performance 1 0.822** 0.8983 0.6885 
Relationship Performance 2 0.820**   
Relationship Performance 3 0.863**   
Relationship Performance 4 0.813**   
** Significant at alpha = .01  




Table 4 Correlation Matrix and Discriminant Validity. 
Constructs  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Buyer’s Asset Specificity 0.857            
2. Seller’s Asset Specificity 0.657 0.857           
3. Trust 0.331 0.517 0.813          
4. Performance 0.495 0.644 0.675 0.830         






0.144 0.052 0.732        








0.032 0.740       
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0.336 -    










0.113 0.106 -   





















0.145 0.143 0.026 0.073 - 
a: Operationalized by interaction-term between buyer and seller’s asset specificity; b: Operationalized by absolute difference 
between buyer and seller’s asset specificity; c: Formative construct; d: Constructs measured by single item;  






Table 5. PLS Hypotheses Testing and Model Goodness-of-Fit 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 
Controlled Effect Estimates       
Buyer’s Firm Age -> 
Performance 
-0.135 -0.122* -0.122* -0.122* -0.122* -0.122* 
Buyer’s Firm Age -> Trust -0.030 -0.034 -0.038 -.0.031 -0.020 -0.029 
Buyer’s Asset Specificity 
->Performance 
0.157* 0.156** 0.156** 0.156* 0.156* 0.156* 
Buyer’s Asset Specificity 
-> Trust 
-0.006 0.048 -0.023 0.031 0.016 0.000 
Power-> Performance -0.142** -0.090* -0.090 -0.090 -0.090 -0.090 
Power -> Trust -0.110 -0.123* -0.107* -0.108 -0.089 -0.098 
Duration -> Performance -0.046 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 
Duration -> Trust -0.094 -0.075 -0.049 -0.091 -0.088 -0.071 
Contact Frequencies -> 
Performance 
0.143** 0.087* 0.087* 0.086* 0.086* 0.086* 
Contact Frequencies -> 
Trust 
0.121* 0.097* 0.124* 0.124* 0.093 0.089 
Psychic 
Distance->Performance 
0.045 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 
Psychic Distance->Trust -0.104 -0.119 -0.096 -0.101 -0.111 -0.106 
Seller’s Asset Specificity 
->Performance 
0.517** 0.277** 0.277** 0.277** 0.277** 0.277** 
Seller’s Asset Specificity 
-> Trust 
0.551** 0.510** 0.528** 0.474** 0.479** 0.482** 
Buyer’s Size -> 
Performance 
0.046 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 





    
Trust -> Performance (H4)  0.451** 0.451** 0.451** 0.451** 0.451** 
Achieving Goodwill 
Reciprocity a-> Trust (H1) 
 0.147** 0.124*   0.105* 
Achieving Goodwill 




-0.003   
0.001 
Violating Equivalence 




 -0.084 -0.084 
-0.076 
Violating Equivalence 




  -0.130** 
-0.020** 




    
Adjusted R2 0.462 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.619 0.619 
SRMR 0.060 0.062 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.065 
a: Operationalized by interaction-term between buyer and seller’s asset specificity; b: Operationalized by absolute difference 





Table 6. Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
Hypotheses Contents Results 
Hypothesis 1 Achieving goodwill reciprocity within bilateral 
asset specificity enhances trust. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2. Violating equivalence reciprocity within bilateral 
asset specificity harms trust. 
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 3a. Achieving goodwill reciprocity within bilateral 
asset specificity more effectively enhances trust 
over the relationship duration. 
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 3b. Violating equivalence reciprocity within bilateral 
asset specificity more severely harms trust over the 
relationship duration. 
Supported 





Table 7. CFA Marker: the CMV Check 
Model Chi-Square df CFI 
CFA 356.39 142 0.96 
Baseline 363.97 146 0.96 
Method-Constrained 360.21 145 0.96 
Method-Unconstrained 351.55 130 0.96 
Chi-Square Comparison Results ∆ ぬ2 ∆ df Chi-Square Critical Value 
Baseline vs Method-C 3.76 1 3.841 
Method-C vs Method-U 8.66 15 24.996 
 Note: the insignificance of ∆ ぬ2 statistics indicate our results is not biased by congeneric nor 






Appendix: Measurement Scales  
Construct Measurement 
Buyer’s Firm Age How long has your firm been in business? ___years 
Buyer’s Firm Size  How many full-time employees does your company have? ____employees 
(employee No.) 
Dependence What percentage of the total purchasing volume in this product category is 
accounted for by this supplier (0%.–100%)? ___%. 
Relationship Duration How long have your company been doing business with this supplier? _____years 
Contact Frequencies 
 
Please indicate the frequency your firm did business with this supplier?  




(Adapted from Katsikeas et al. (2009), Jan B Heide and John (1990), and Rokkan 
et al. (2003)).  
1. This supplier has invested a great deal in our business. 
2. This supplier has made extensive internal adjustments in order to deal 
effectively with our firm 
3. This supplier has made substantial commitments of time and money in 
training their people to deal with our firm. 
4. This supplier has gone out of its way to link us with their product line or 
logistic system.  (7 points strongly disagree… strongly agree scale) 
Buyer’s Asset 
Specificity 
(Adapted from Katsikeas et al. (2009), Jan B Heide and John (1990), and Rokkan 
et al. (2003)). 
1. We have invested a great deal in this supplier’s business. 
2. We have made extensive internal adjustments in order to deal effectively 
with this supplier. 
3. Our firm has made substantial commitments of time and money in training 
our people to deal with this supplier. 
4. Our firm has gone out of its way to link this supplier with our product line or 
logistic system.  
(7 points strongly disagree… strongly agree scale) 
Psychic Distance (Formative scale adapted from Bello and Briggs (2009); Obadia, Bello, and 
Gilliland (2015)) Please evaluate the degree of dissimilarity in this supplier’s 
operating country and environment. 
1. Culture (traditions, values, language)  
2. Accepted business practices  
3. Economic environment  
4. Legal system  
5. Communication infrastructure 
(7 points very similar… very different scale) 
Trust (Adapted from Doney and Cannon (1997)) 
1. This supplier keeps promises it makes to our firm. 
2. We believe the information that this vendor provides us. 
3. When making important decisions, this supplier considers our welfare as 
well as its own. 
4. We trust this vendor keeps our best interests in mind.  




(Adapted from Selnes and Sallis (2003)) 
1. Flexibility to handle unforeseen fluctuations in demand has been improved 
because of the relationship. 
2. The relationship with this supplier company has resulted in better product 
quality. 
3. The relationship has a positive effect on our ability to develop successful 
new products. 
4. The relationship helps us to detect changes in end-user needs and preferences 
before our competitors do. 
(7 points strongly disagree… strongly agree scale) 
55 
 
Relative Importance of 
Goals in Attaining 
Trade Show 
(CFA Marker adapted from Godar and O'Connor (2001)) 
Please evaluate the importance of following objectives for your attendance to this 
trade show… 
1. Collect information about new products/developments in the industry. 
2. Collect information about competitors’ prices, products, and strategies. 
3. Collect information in general.  
(7 points strongly disagree… strongly agree scale) 
 
 
 
